Liberal-NDP Electoral Co-operation Options

Posted by Devin Johnston on November 2nd, 2009

Federal NDP candidate Michael Byers has called for the Liberals and NDP to work together in the next election to prevent a Conservative majority. I have written previously about this topic, but it's worth exploring again in light of Byers' public call for cross-party co-operation.

Byers' proposal is that the Liberals and NDP would not run candidates in the same ridings. Instead, the party which received the largest share of the vote in each riding would run a candidate, while the other party would not contest that riding. The idea is that this would prevent vote splitting by allowing centre-left voters to pool their support. Byers claims that this would allow the Liberals to win an additional 30 to 40 seats and allow the NDP to win an additional 5 to 10 - hopefully enough to prevent Stephen Harper from winning a majority mandate.

It's important to note that Byers' proposal is not a proposal for a coalition government. A coalition is when two or more parties decide to govern together after an election has taken place. This proposal would be for the two parties to strategically co-operate during an election in order to maximize their chances of winning more seats. That said, adopting an electoral co-operation strategy would have clear implications for the possibility of a post-election coalition. In particular, the likely outcome of effective co-operation would be a Liberal plurality in the House of Commons, meaning that the NDP would be well-positioned to either enter into a coalition or else hold the balance of power in a Liberal minority government.

Alternative Proposals

Before I get into my analysis, it's important to note that Byers' proposal is not the only way that the Liberals and NDP could co-operate with one another in the next election. I think that there are at least two alternative proposals, which I will analyze as well.

The Byers' proposal assumes a principle of non-competition between the parties in the sense that there would only be one Liberal or NDP candidate per riding. In his proposal, the determination of which party runs in a particular riding is based on the results of the last election: whichever party received more votes last time around gets to run uncontested by the other this time. This means that the Liberals would end up running far more candidates than the NDP. We'll call this proposal the "Byers proposal".

The first alternative is a modification of the Byers proposal. It embraces the principle of non-competition. Under this alternative, however, the ridings would be split up on a 50/50 basis. That is, each party would run exactly 154 candidates in the next election. We'll call this proposal the "modified Byers proposal".

The third alternative is a more limited arrangement in which the parties would agree to to run candidates in a limited number of ridings (say, 20 ridings each). Under this proposal, the Liberals and NDP would still run candidates against one another in most ridings, but they would strategically choose not to compete is a limited number of key ridings where non-competition will be mutually beneficial. We will call this proposal the "limited proposal".

Assessing the Proposals

I will assess each proposal according to five dimensions, which can be summarized in terms of the following questions:

1. Does the proposal meet the NDP's strategic objectives?
2. Would the proposal be effective?
3. Would the outcome of the election be seen as legitimate by the public?
4. Would the Liberals ever agree to the proposal?
5. Are there other considerations at play?

Note that I am looking at this from the perspective of a New Democrat since, well, I am one. Liberals would need to do a similar assessment based on their own needs and objectives. However, I am poorly positioned to know what those are.

Strategic Objectives for the NDP

For the purposes of electoral co-operation, I think that there are at least three strategic considerations for the NDP:

1. hold the balance of power in a minority Parliament in order to advance the party's legislative priorities;
2. increase the party's share of seats in the House of Commons; and,
3. change the public's perception that the NDP doesn't have a realistic shot of governing.

The second objective will be addressed in the next section, as it is intimately related to the effectiveness of the three co-operation strategies.

The first objective speaks to the main reason that might motivate New Democrats to enter into an electoral co-operation deal. Assuming that an NDP majority government is at least two elections away, the best immediate possibility for the party to make gains on key policy priorities is to hold the balance of power in a minority Parliament and/or form part of a coalition government. In the short term, the New Democrats are best served by a minority Parliament, even to the extent that a Conservative minority is better for the NDP than a Liberal majority.

Assuming that the Byers proposal is wildly successful, it would be possible for the Liberals to win a majority government on the strength of non-competition from the NDP in more than half of the ridings in the country. This would be a disaster for the NDP because they would lose all of their bargaining power in a Liberal majority situation. It makes no sense for the NDP to stand down more than half of its candidates unless the possibility of a Liberal majority is off the table.

The modified Byers proposal addresses this concern by limiting both parties to 154 candidates. This means that even in an absolute best-case scenario, neither party would be able to win an outright majority. This approach would entrench the NDP's balance of power in the House of Commons and might pave the way for a Liberal-NDP coalition.

The limited proposal does not guarantee against a Liberal majority. However, it is also less of a strategic gamble for the NDP because they would still be running candidates in the vast majority of federal ridings. Realistically, it is unlikely that the Liberals could win a majority as long as the NDP contests most ridings. In this sense, the limited proposal may be just enough to prevent a Conservative majority without going too far the other way and handing the Liberals a majority.

The third objective is critical for the NDP. In order to move beyond its traditional role as the conscience of the Parliament, the NDP must convince voters that it is a viable governing alternative to the Liberals and Conservatives. Not only must the party show that it would govern sensibly, it must also demonstrate that it is capable of winning federal elections. Unless the NDP can overcome this hurdle, it will always suffer from the effects of so-called strategic voting.

The Byers proposal can be attacked on the basis that it frustrates this strategic objective for the NDP. Under the Byers proposal, the Liberals would end up running far more candidates than the NDP, based on the results of the last election. The NDP can't afford to concede that much ground, because it carries the implication that the Liberals are better-positioned to defeat the Conservatives - precisely the proposition that the NDP must seek to falsify.

Both the modified Byers proposal and the limited proposal are preferable insofar as the NDP would stand on an equal footing with the Liberals.

Effectiveness

A number of bloggers have already jumped on Byers by pointing out that his arithmetic may be flawed. As the Jurist argues, the idea of electoral co-operation presupposes that Liberal voters will pick the NDP as a second choice and vice-versa. This may turn out to be substantially false in a number of ridings where the bulk of Liberal voters may militate toward the Conservatives, not the NDP, in the event that there is no Liberal on the ballot. Ironically, standing down the distant Liberal candidate in a riding where only the NDP and Conservatives are competitive may end up giving the Conservative enough of a bump to beat out the New Democrat.

On top of the problem of the unpredictability of voters' second choices, it must also be recognized that a lot of Liberals and New Democrats will be frustrated at the lack of choice on the ballot. If there is any wide-scale co-operation between parties, they should expect disgruntled former candidates to run protest campaigns as independents and/or protest votes for the Conservatives, Bloc, and Greens. Consider, for example, how Liberals might react to not having a Liberal candidate in Outremont.

Both the Byers proposal and the modified Byers proposal would suffer from the protest vote defect. The limited proposal might be more successful because the ridings targeted for non-competition could be strategically selected to avoid intra-party strife. However, it is still somewhat difficult to predict what voters' second choices will be, or even if they will bother showing up to vote for a party other than the one they actually support.

Legitimacy

Notwithstanding the effect that electoral co-operation might have on the outcome of an election, the Liberals and NDP must also consider the extent to which the public would view such co-operation as democratically legitimate. As pogge writes:

It amounts to party insiders colluding to rig the outcome of an election by taking decisions away from voters in individual ridings about who they wish to have represent them.

On Facebook, former NDP press secretary Ian Capstick pointed out that the NDP gave the Liberals a lot of flack when they decided not to run a candidate against Elizabeth May in the last general election. As I indicated at the time, I find it problematic for political parties to collude to deprive voters of a robust menu of democratic choice in an election.

On the other hand, co-operating during an election might have a positive effect in terms of the legitimacy of a post-election coalition. One of the key criticisms of the Liberal-NDP coalition proposal last year was that voters were never really presented with the possibility of a coalition when they cast their ballots. An electoral co-operation agreement would at least imply the possibility of a coalition, so the public might be more willing to accept that outcome.

Having said that, a co-operation deal might very well have the effect of laying bare the defects of the first-past-the-post electoral system. If the Liberals managed to win more seats than the Conservatives despite losing the poplar vote by a substantial margin (probably by more than 10% if they aren't running candidates in strong NDP ridings), the public might see the outcome of the election as illegitimate regardless of which party or parties end up in government.

There might also be a concern about legitimacy in terms of internal party democracy, which I will address under the heading "Other Considerations".

Liberal Receptiveness

Of course all of these considerations are academic unless the Liberals would agree to them. Given Ignatieff's "there never was a coalition and there never will be" message, it is unlikely that he would be amenable to any proposal that the Conservatives might use to portray the Liberals as being in cahoots with the NDP. For that reason, any sort of extensive arrangement is probably off the table.

The Liberals would stand to benefit more from the Byers proposal than from any other alternative. However, agreeing to such a proposal would look an awful lot to the Conservatives and their supporters like a merger of parties. There would be political blowback for such an arrangement in the form of attack ads, misinformation, and conspiracy theories.

The limited proposal might be more palatable both to the Liberals and to voters precisely because it is so much smaller in scope. However, there would still be reason for the Liberals to be apprehensive of accepting such an arrangement.

Other Considerations

There are more considerations at play than those I can deal with in the blog medium, however I do want to briefly touch on a couple additional points.

The first is the issue of whether New Democrats can trust Michael Ignatieff. Recall that during the coalition crisis, the NDP went way out on a limb to work with the Liberals. After signing a coalition agreement (which Michael Ignatieff endorsed in a letter to the Governor General), Michael Ignatieff pulled the rug out from under Layton's feet and tore up that agreement. This has left deep feelings of mistrust and resentment by many New Democrats toward the Liberals in general and Iffy in particular.

Under the Byers proposal, it would be possible for Ignatieff to win a majority government. In that case, Ignatieff could then go on and govern without the NDP holding the balance of power. I don't think there is anyone in the NDP who would consider that situation an improvement over the current Conservative minority in which the NDP can secure compromises on public policy. The trust issue is central here, because the NDP would need assurances that they will hold some influence over Ignatieff when the elctoral dust settles.

Another consideration for the NDP is whether it would even be possible to stand down candidates on anything more than a very limited basis. Unlike most other political parties, our leader has only a very limited authority to intervene in the nomination of candidates at the constituency level. Realistically, the NDP would not be able to agree to any electoral co-operation with the Liberals without securing the approval of the affected riding associations. This would make any negotiations with the Liberals extremely cumbersome.

All three proposals suffer from this weakness, although the limited proposal would be easier insofar as there are a smaller number of riding associations that would need to be consulted.

Conclusions

Overall, the drawbacks of all three proposals outweigh any benefits they might afford the NDP. They are fraught with problems of legitimacy, effectiveness, and practicality.

The Byers proposal, which doesn't guarantee the a balance of power and requires the NDP to stand down the majority of its candidates, is an absolute non-starter.

The modified Byers proposal is better, but its effectiveness is dubious and it would be very difficult to implement within the Constitution of the NDP.

The limited proposal is attractive because it would be much less ambitious. By properly targeting ridings, it might be just enough to prevent a Conservative majority, but not so extensive as to make it impossible to implement. That said, it is still not clear that the NDP would get good value for its bargain in terms of electing more New Democrats to the House, due to the difficulty of predicting voters' second choices.

At the end of the day, electoral co-operation with the Liberals just doesn't make strategic sense for the NDP. Rather than trying to manipulate an imperfect electoral system to squeeze more seats out of our current level of popular support, we are better served by increasing our popular support.

Update

Calgary Grit points out something obvious that I failed to observe:

both parties, by virtue of running in fewer ridings, would lose a lot of cash on per-vote subsidy funding.

Spread the word and fan the winds of change: